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Abstract
Ancillary Services (AS) in electric power industry are critical to support the transmission
of energy from generators to load demands while maintaining reliable operation of transmission
systems in accordance with good utility practice. The ancillary services are procured by the
independent system operator (ISO) through a process called the market clearing process which
can be modeled by the partial equilibrium from the ends of ISO. There are two capacity opti-
mization problems for both Market participants (MP) and Independent System Operator (ISO).
For a market participant, the firm needs to determine the capacity allocation plan for various
AS to pursue operating revenue under various uncertainties which can never be accurately es-
timated. We thereby employ a heuristic named “resource reservation” to suggest two types of
bids, the regular and the must-win for a market participant to pursue higher expected revenue
and satisfactory performance in terms of revenue under the worst case scenario. Meanwhile, the
ISO, needs to determine the total amount of capacity required to guarantee the overall reliabil-
ity of the transmission system. Our numerical experiment is based on our industrial partner’
operational data and the simulation result suggests that our proposed methods would greatly
∗Corresponding Author
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outperform the deterministic methods in terms of the profitability for a market participant and
the ISO’s entire system’s reliability.
Keywords: Electricity Markets, Ancillary Services, Resource Reservation, Chance Constrained
Optimization
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1 Introduction
1.1 ancillary services market for the power system reliability
In the electricity industry, ancillary service is critical to support the transmission of generated
energy to loads, while maintaining reliable operation of the Transmission Service Providers (TSPs)
in the transmission system. Ancillary services (AS) are commonly recognized in the industry
as a collection of secondary services offered to ensure the reliability and availability of energy.
According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the ancillary Services are defined
as “services necessary to support the transmission of electric power from seller to purchaser given
the obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities within those control areas to maintain
reliable operations of the interconnected transmission system” in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NOPR) (see [5]).
Ancillary services have been an important topic since 1995 when the FERC issued a major rule
on open-access nondiscriminatory transmission service. Ancillary services are now openly traded
at a financial settlement market for efficient acquisition and pricing. More importantly, the an-
cillary services market is beneficial to the power system for the following reasons: 1) the market
provides transparent economic signals to govern the provision of these services; 2) the market rec-
onciles operating practices with market incentives so that participating parties are compensated for
providing reliability; 3) ancillary services market would also reduce cost to meet reliability require-
ments; and 4) correctly pricing energy and ancillary service under shortage conditions is important
for resource adequacy in an Energy-only market [12]. Hence, ancillary services have quickly become
irreplaceable functions to ensure the reliability and availability of energy to consumers.
1.2 Ancillary services acquired
The procurement of ancillary services is either cost-based or market-based. The cost-based pro-
curement is to purchase services offered at pre-determined regulated costs and the market-based
procurement is to purchase the services provided at market rates, granted by state or federal au-
thorities. There are four ancillary services: regulation reserve (denoted in short as “regulation” in
this paper), spinning reserve (“spinning”), non-spinning reserve (“non-spinning”), and replacement
reserve (“replacement”), which are procured through market clearing processes. Before introducing
the market clearing process, we briefly introduce these four major ancillary services.
Regulation is the use of online generation of well-configured units that can change output quickly
to track the minimal fluctuations, e.g. 1 ∼ 5 seconds in customer loads and unintended fluctuations
(see [6]). Regulation helps maintain interconnection frequency, minimize differences between actual
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and scheduled power flows between control areas, and match generation to load within the control
area.
Spinning is the use of online generating equipment which is synchronized to the grid to increase
output responding immediately to changes in power balance, so that it can be fully available within
ten minutes to correct for generation/load imbalances caused by generation or transmission outages
(see [6]).
Non-Spinning can be synchronized and ramped to a specified output level within 30 minutes
and operates at a specified output level for at least one hour. Non-Spinning reserve may also be
provided from unloaded capacity which meets the 30-minute response requirements, and is reserved
exclusively to be used for this service.
Replacement is the service by which the ISO needs to make sure it has enough online capacity
for a well-functioning balancing market on an hourly basis (see [14] for details).
Other ancillary services We must remark that there are two other services, voltage support and
black start. These services are not required through a market clearing process, and therefore, are
excluded from the scope of this paper.
1.3 Market clearing process
Ancillary services are procured by the market clearing process which determines quantities and
prices of ancillary services where the quantity supplied equals to quantity demanded. In the past,
ISO used to procure ancillary services in the sequential market in which ancillary services market
bids by certain supplier include the overall available capacity for ancillary services, bid prices and
fixed capacities by service types. This system has been proved less efficient, when closely related
services, such as regulation and spinning are procured in separate markets, and in such cases
inefficiencies can occur (see [2]). Some cases are observed, where higher valued ancillary services
are priced lower (see [1] and [8]). Some ISO, e.g. the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT),
has changed the ancillary markets to avoid this unwanted consequence.
The current experience is called simultaneous co-optimization, which determines energy and
ancillary service schedules at the same time, based on an evaluation of all the trade-offs involved
in resource scheduling. There are several benefits for implementing the co-optimization. First, the
co-optimization will minimize total cost of energy and ancillary services; ensure that all energy and
ancillary services requirements are satisfied; consider trade-offs between a unit producing energy
or providing ancillary services; and a market participant will have incentive to submit offers that
reflect their actual marginal costs. We use example 1.3 to illustrate the co-optimization.
Example 1 (Example for the co-optimization market). Consider that a public agency needs power
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and ancillary service. Today, he needs 50MW electricity and 5MW ancillary services. There are two
market participants, A and B with the following capacities and prices respectively. If he purchases
MP Capacity (MW) Electricity ($/MW) Ancillary service ($/MW)
A 40 $1 $2
B 20 $3 $6
them in a sequential order of electricity then ancillary service, the total cost is
$1× 40 + $3× 10 + $6× 5 = $100 (1)
If he purchases them in a co-optimization market, then the total cost becomes
$1× 35 + $3× 15 + $2× 5 = $90 (2)
Thus, the co-optimization market will reduce the overall cost of the public agency.
The prices of ancillary services determined by the market are called market clearing price
(MCP) and we will use this term throughout this paper. It is also called equilibrium price in other
literature. Suppliers who bid to provide ancillary services must bear various technical operating
characteristics. Each bid consists of a capacity price ($/MW) and quantity (MW). The amount
of awards of each ancillary service increases with their capacity price. All markets are cleared
and suppliers are given the MCP and how much the capacity is accepted (see [17] and references
therein). For each ancillary service type, the MCP is the value when demand meets aggregated
system-wide offer of a specific ancillary service type. Since there are hundreds of suppliers and
the MCPs are determined by all the bids submitted, individual bid will not significantly change
the service type MCP. The MCP is systemically discussed in the literature (see [4, 15, 16] and
references therein).
For the ancillary services market, the MCP is determined by the partial equilibrium (PE),
which is a type of economic equilibrium, where the clearance on the market of some specific goods
is obtained independently from prices and quantities demanded and supplied in other markets. In
the ancillary services market, the ancillary services’ demand and supply curves are well isolated
from other alternatives. The reason is obvious that there is no much alternative available to replace
the ancillary services, although, markets do not operate in a vacuum. Factors other than prices and
capacities interact in complex ways to affect the procurements of the ancillary services. The political
and cultural systems, electricity distribution, and innovative techniques place the contribution of
the equilibrium analysis in a broader context. In particular, in a world of uncertainty and conflicting
interests, analysis does not automatically translate into decision making. The insights derived from
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the partial equilibrium must be integrated with these broader considerations. The emphasis is on
developing an approach to understanding and assessing the problems and using the analysis as an
aid to decision making.
We present the PE analysis as the follow. Under the abundant conditions, the supply curve
sets the price and the demand curve determines the amount of ancillary service supplied (see
Figure 1 left) where the term OR requirement means the necessary capacity of operating reserves.
Figure 1: Partial equilibrium under abundant (left) and scarcity (right) conditions
Likewise, under the scarcity conditions, the demand curve sets the price and the supply curve
determines the amount supplied (see Figure 1 right). Our partner, ERCOT, has the operating
data to confirm the existences of supply curves. For example, the supply curves for the non-
spinning service on 12:00am-1:00am, November 10, 2010 are presented to illustrate both abundant
(left) and scarcity (right) conditions respectively in Figure 2. Solving PE model at the ISO level
Figure 2: ERCOT’s sample supply curves
would address the market clearing price, and might provide some results on the distribution of the
prices. However, we will not use the PE model for individual market participant’s ancillary services
capacity allocation decision because the MCP is determined at the ancillary services market where
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the individual market participant’s allocation decision is less likely to impact the market clearing
process significantly.
All awarded offers would be paid at MCP, due to the commonly adapted paid-by-clearing
mechanism. Under this system, the price of ancillary service is equal to the opportunity cost
of non-operating generators (see [2]). This mechanism is formulated by federal regulations, in
order to regulate the ancillary services market and to encourage suppliers to lower down their
generators’ variable cost. Given an energy price and the suppliers’ variable cost, the opportunity
of not operating the generator becomes the cost of ancillary services. Thus, suppliers with a low
variable cost will have a lower cost of ancillary services. In a competitive market environment,
there is no reason to place greater bid price because all the winning bids would be paid at MCP
regardless the bid price previously placed. When a bid price greater than the cost is placed, the
supplier has to take the risk of losing the contract. To avoid these risks, a market participant
usually place bids at their generators’ opportunity costs.
1.4 Optimization models for the market clearing process
There are two optimization problems for both market participants and ISO. For a market partic-
ipant, the firm usually has a fixed amount of generator capacity for ancillary services. The firm
needs to determine the capacity allocation plan to pursue better profit prior to the market clearing
process. Thus, this is formulated as resource allocation problem under uncertainty by stochastic
programming with recourse. However, stochastic programming model with recourse requires the
possession of the distributional information which is usually, unfortunately, unavailable or inac-
curate at the best. Although there are seasonal trends from the historical data, it is extremely
difficult to estimate such demands accurately. We thereby propose a heuristic named “resource
reservation” to pursue higher expected revenue and satisfactory performance in terms of revenue
under the worst case scenario. Meanwhile, the ISO needs to determine the total amount of ancillary
services to ensure satisfactory system reliability at a certain probabilistic level. Thus, the model
for ISO is formulated as chance constrained optimization. Both problems have different objectives.
The market participant capacity allocation plan is aimed to maximize the firm profitability and
the ISO total ancillary services amount is to pursue better system reliability.
The current practices on these optimization problems are rather deterministic. For the market
participant’s capacity allocation plan, the firm will simply allocate all the capacities to the ancillary
service with the most promising projected prices. Similarly, the ISO estimates the required total
ancillary service amounts from historical data with seasonal adjustments. Both solutions totally
ignore the randomnesses during the MCP and they are heavily relying on the projections, which
could be incomplete, erroneous, or wrong. Under the less satisfactory projections, the resulting op-
7
timal solution would be more likely to be problematic. As a solution, some optimization techniques
which attempt to tackle the various uncertainties have been developed since the 1950s (see [13] and
references therein). In many cases, the stochastic optimization models have shown the advantage
over the deterministic models both numerically and theoretically.
The obstacle on the way of deploying stochastic models is primarily computational concerns.
Comparing with the simple and computationally efficient deterministic models, the stochastic mod-
els, however, seem to be complicated in formulation, and demand more time and computational
expenses. In this paper, we model both problems with strong uncertainties as convex optimization
problems and thus, we employ computationally efficient solvers to obtain optimal solution within a
timely manner. We organize the remaining part of the paper as follows. We propose the stochas-
tic models for the market participant’s capacity allocation planning problem in Section 2 with our
novel “resource reservation” method. We propose the ISO’s total ancillary services amount problem
in Section 3 and solve it by an approximation scheme. We show the merit of proposed stochastic
models by the real operational data from ERCOT in Section 4 and the results suggest that our
proposed method would yield better revenue for a market participant and more reliability for ISO.
We conclude our research in Section 5.
2 MP’s ancillary service capacity allocation planning problem
The purpose of proposed models is to determine bid quantities for multiple ancillary services from a
capacity-limited supplier, who is a price-taker. The bid prices for these services are determined by
the opportunity cost of not operating generator, and thus the bid prices are largely fixed. When the
supplier wins the bid, the service will yield revenue at MCP. If we know market clearing prices for
each ancillary service type, it is trivial that the MCP will allocate all the capacity to the most highly
paid services. In reality, neither MCPs nor their distributional information have been available until
the auction is closed. Thus, before formulating the model by stochastic programming, we need to
address the issue that how to properly model the market clearing price in Subsection 2.1.
2.1 Market clearing price modeling
In order to quantitatively model the market clearing price, we acquire real-world data from ERCOT.
ERCOT market first opened in July 2001. In September 2005, ERCOT modified the procuring
process to simultaneously procure all the ancillary services in the day-ahead manner, with the
objective to minimize the total ancillary services procurement costs.
We notice that the MCPs are constantly changing in both numerical values and distributions.
In Figure 3, we present the MCP’s histogram, quantile comparison plot against normal and χ2
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Figure 3: March 2010 Market Clearing Price at ERCOT
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Figure 4: April 2010 Market Clearing Price at ERCOT
distributions. We repeat the plotting in Figure 4 on ERCOT’s April MCP data. It can be observed
that the histograms are substantially different. We also tried other commonly used distributions
such as exponential and Weibull with the similar conclusion that the MCPs are constantly changing
in terms of numerical values and best-fit distributions and none of known distributions can be
properly assumed as model inputs.
Table 1 shows hourly summary statistics of price dispersion characteristics for the ancillary
services’ MCP. We use the following abbreviations: SD - Standard deviation; RT - Real-time
market; DA - Day-ahead market; and CoV - Coefficient of Variation. Both variations and ranges
reflect the strong uncertainty involved. The MCP differences on the real time market and the day
ahead market are strongly uncertain as well. We illustrate the operational data for the regulation
service MCP differences in Figure 5.
Clearly, all the above evidences suggest that we will inevitably encounter immense difficulty
when estimating the general distributional information for the MCP on both the day-ahead and
the real-time markets. Thus, assessing the distribution of random variables in the ancillary services
capacity allocation becomes a lofty goal but difficult to achieve. Under this circumstance, we realize
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Max Average Minimum SD CoV
Regulation-DA $45.38 $11.04 $2.75 $5.13 46.50%
Spinning-DA $24.97 $2.96 $0.38 $3.28 110.52%
Non-Spinning-DA $9.00 $1.08 $0.38 $0.86 79.94%
Regulation-RT $125.78 $12.51 $2.34 $12.46 99.65%
Spinning-RT $87.45 $2.26 $0.18 $6.37 281.31%
Non-Spinning-RT $48.41 $1.02 $0.18 $2.54 249.28%
Table 1: Hourly MCP summary statistics for September, 2010
Figure 5: Day ahead market MCP differences
that the jump diffusion techniques may be suitable to build optimization models for the ancillary
services capacity allocation. Nevertheless, the current practice at the ISOs are primarily based on
the linear/nonlinear optimization and PE analysis, and we would like to study the jump diffusion
based optimization as our future topics. Based on the above observation, we conclude that MCPs
are constantly changing from time to time and should not be assumed any specific distribution.
2.2 Stochastic programming formulation
Consider a market participant providing n ancillary services fromm generators by distinct locations
with a fixed capacity c := [c1, . . . , cm]
′. Since the market clearing prices are constantly changing and
highly unpredictable, the market participant usually place K pre-determined bid prices pijk, i =
10
1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, k = 1, . . . ,K. The decision variables are the amount of capacities allocated
to ancillary services at distinct locations with distinct bid prices, xijk. The demands on these
ancillary services are random variables ζijk. Thus, the ancillary service capacity allocation is
max
x
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
pijkxijk
subject to
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
xijk ≤ cj , i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, k = 1, . . . ,K (3)
xijk ≤ ζijk (4)
which can be equivalently re-formulated as a nonlinear optimization:
φ(c) := max
x
{
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
pijkE[min(xijk, ζijk)] :
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
xijk ≤ cj , j = 1, . . . ,m} (5)
and φ(·) : Rm → R is the optimal function.
The model (5) will provide a bidding capacity allocation plan for ancillary services before the
MCPs are revealed. The solution is the fixed amount of capacity to multiple services and imple-
menting this solution directly will be sub-optimal, because the result will “backfire” the revenue.
The ancillary service market is an unanimously paid (so called “paid by clearing”) market. In this
market, all winning offers are paid at MCP. This has become a regulation code by North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). For instance, when finalized MCP is between bid prices
pij(κ−1) and pijκ, the allocation, xijk, will be unsold and the capacity of
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1
∑κ−1
k=1 xijk will
be procured at MCP. The optimal solution is to allocate as much capacity as possible to the ancil-
lary service with the greatest MCP. Nevertheless, implementing the solution from (5) may lead to
lower revenue.
We need to apply a post optimization treatment, named nesting, which suggests that the ancil-
lary services with higher MCP will have higher priority in acquiring the fixed generator capacity.
Under the current ERCOT market clearing process, the market participants can integrate the
nesting operation into their capacity allocation. We illustrate this mechanism by the following
example. Consider a supplier, which provides three ancillary services, i.e. regulation, spinning, and
non-spinning with total capacity of 100MW. Regulation, spinning, and non-spinning services’ nom-
inal MCPs are ($25, $20, $15) and the optimal solution of model (15) is (30, 40, 30)MW respectively.
Without nesting, the supplier will place bids for three services as the following,
• Regulation bid, 30MW at $10 per MW.
• Spinning bid, 40MW at $10 per MW.
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• Non-spinning bid, 30MW at $10 per MW.
When implementing the above algorithm, the supplier will place three flexible bids.
• Regulation bid, 30 ∼ 100MW at $10 per MW.
• Spinning bid, 40 ∼ 70MW at $10 per MW.
• Non-spinning bid, up to 30MW at $10 per MW.
When the realized MCPs are $25, $20, $15, nesting will not affect the revenue generated by both
methods. However, when the realized MCPs are $15, $25, $18, the revenue when nesting is excluded
will be
$15× 30 + $25× 40 + $18× 30 = 1990
and the revenue with nesting becomes
$15× 30 + $25× 70 + $18× 0 = 2200 > 1990
In Section 4, we show that the nesting mechanism will outperform the non-nesting method by the
real-world data based simulations.
This model is a typical stochastic programming which can be handily solved as long as the
distributional information of ζ is available. However, the estimation of ζ could be very rough if it is
not worse. The underlying distribution of model (5) would be substantially different in reality and
consequently, the obtained solution becomes problematic. Thus, this problem becomes stochastic
programming with stability issues and it is usually a difficult problem. Thanks to the “paid by
clearing” of the market clearing process, it is possible for us to develop a heuristic to place bids
without ζ’s distribution information.
2.3 Resource reservation heuristic
We will present a method “resource reservation” (RR) as a practical heuristic for the stability
issue of the resource allocation problem. Since this method can also be applied to other resource
allocation problems and we need to cite theoretical results from past literature to justify this
heuristic, we adopt the standard formulation of stochastic programming as follows:
min f0(x) + E[g(x, ξ)]
subject to Ax ≤ b (6)
for the sake of simplifying notation. For the above model, the random variable x is on (Ω,F ,P)
where P is the underlying, but rough estimation of distributional information of ξ. A ∈ Rm×n, and
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functions g : Rn × Ω → R, f0(x) : Rn → R are convex with respect to x. We are interested in
the model performance under the real distribution of ξ is another measure, Q. For the problem in
this paper, we can assume that f0(x), g(x, ξ) are defined on a compact set and all the constraints
Ax ≤ b are deterministic and nonempty. Let us define
1. ν(P) := inf{f0(x) + E[g(x, ξ)] : Ax ≤ b}.
2. X∗ (P) := {Ax ≤ b : f0(x) + E[g(x, ξ)] ≤ ν(P) + }.
3. X∗(P) := X∗0 (P) = {Ax ≤ b : f0(x) + E[g(x, ξ)] = ν(P)}
where  > 0.
The stability of stochastic programming, in general, is rather difficult. The current research
is about the continuity of the objective function and the Lipschitz property on the optimal value
function. For the discussion of continuity, the distance has to be selected such that it allows to
estimate differences of objective and constraint function values, and it is optimum adapted to
the model. In the literature, a distances with ζ-structure that are given uniform distances of
expectations:
dF (P,Q) := sup
f∈F
∣∣∣∣EP[f(ξ)]− EQ[f(ξ)]
∣∣∣∣. (7)
In practice, one possible useful quantitative stability result is with respect to weak convergence of
probability measures.
Theorem 1. Let the set {x : Ax ≤ b} be non-empty. Let a sequence of probability measures {Pn}
is weakly convergent to Q and
lim
n→∞
dF (Pn,Q) = 0. (8)
Then the sequence ν(Pn) converges to ν(P) and
lim
n→∞
sup
x∈X∗(Pn)
[ inf
y∈X∗(Q)
{||x− y||}] = 0 (9)
Proof. The proof is in [11].
The above theorem plays a central role in justifying the stochastic programming part of our
heuristic. Essentially, the resource reservation can be summarized into to points: first, we need
to adaptively incorporate available information to revise the previous rough estimations on the
distributional information of ξ. Thus, we need to revisit previously placed bids. Second, we need to
control the worst case performance. Since our estimation is never accurate, there is a chance that
our plan may lead to poor performance in terms of the total revenue. Therefore, we propose to
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reserve a certain amount of capacities to ensure the market participant’s satisfactory performance
in terms of revenue.
Consider P1 the first estimation on ξ for model (6). As more information revealed, the estimation
on ξ becomes more meaningful. Thus, we assume that the sequence of underlying probability
measures {Pn} which are the estimations of ξ with continuous “learning”, converges weakly to the
real distribution Q. By theorem 1, the sequence of optimal values {ν(Pn)} will converges to ν(Q),
i.e.,
Pn →w P and ν(Pn)→ ν(Q) (10)
and
lim
n→∞
sup
x∈X∗(Pn)
[ inf
y∈X∗(Q)
{||x− y||}] = 0 (11)
as n→∞. Usually, the model (5) under P1 is solved several days earlier and the bidding plan will
be revisited multiple times prior to the formal placement to incorporate available information as
much as possible. Although the estimation of ξ has been updated towards the true distribution,
the uncertainty during the daily market is still considerably significant. On the other hand, when
bids are placed at ancillary services market, the market participant can not further revise them.
Thus, the placed bids should also control the performance in terms of revenue under the worst case
scenarios.
To control the performance in terms of revenue under the worst case, a robust optimization (RO)
model is suitable because RO method does not without assuming ξ’s distributional information. In
some articles, RO model is described as a quantitative approach to control loss under the worst
scenario and a RO model might seem overly conservative because of the term, the worst scenario.
We need to elaborate that worst scenario does not mean the parameters are all “bad” as they could
be. RO models take into account an uncertainty set, which reflects the fact that the extremely
worst values will not simultaneously occur.
Rather than modeling the demands on pre-determined bid prices, we model the MCP as
unknown-but-bounded random variables, i.e. pij > 0 such that pij ∈ [p∗ij−∆pij , p∗ij+∆pij ] where p∗ij
is the nominal or promising MCP of the ith ancillary service at jth location and ∆pij > 0 is the range
of corresponding price range. We assume p∗ij are distinct and we define p := [p11; . . . ; pij ; . . . ; pmn]
be a mn× 1 dimensional MCP vector. The realized MCP is modeled as
pij = p
∗
ij + uij∆pij , i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, where ||u|| ≤ θ (12)
where u := [u11; . . . ;uij ; . . . ;umn] and || · || is the norm of u. Using `2 norm, the set for possible
MCPs is an ellipsoid,
Uθ =
{
p
∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(pij − p∗ij)2
θ2∆p2ij
≤ 1
}
(13)
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The ancillary capacity allocation problem is
max
[yij ;]
{ n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pijyij :
n∑
i=1
yij ≤ cj , j = 1, . . . ,m, p ∈ Uθ
}
(14)
Theorem 2. Model (14) with general ellipsoidal uncertainty set can be converted into a conic
quadratic program (15) for some θ ≥ 0.
min
{
θ
√√√√ n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∆p2ijy
2
ij −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗ijyij
∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
yij ≤ cj , j = 1, . . . ,m
}
(15)
Proof. We can re-write the model (14) into
min
y
{
t| −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pijyij ≤ t,
n∑
i=1
yij ≤ cj , j = 1, . . . ,m
}
(16)
The constraint −∑ni=1∑mj=1 pijyij ≤ t for p ∈ Uθ is
−
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
pijyij = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗ijyij −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
uij∆pijyij ≤ t
⇐⇒ max
||u||≤θ
−
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
uij∆pijyij ≤ t+
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗ijyij
⇐⇒ θ
√√√√ n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∆p2ijy
2
ij ≤ t+
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗ijyij
⇐⇒ θ
√√√√ n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∆p2ijy
2
ij −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
p∗ijyij ≤ t (17)
We remove t and we reach our conclusion by formulating model (15).
RO model is designed to provide a robust solution under some less favorable scenarios which
are modeled by the uncertainty set. When θ = 0, RO model becomes a linear programming
with nominal parameters. When θ = 1, Uθ becomes the largest volume ellipsoid contained in
B := {p||pij − p∗ij | ≤ ∆pij , i = 1, . . . , n} and when θ =
√
n, Uθ becomes the smallest volume
ellipsoid contains B. Thus, the value of θ would be understood as a trade-off between less risk
averse and more risk averse. A greater θ will lead to a larger ellipsoid or feasible region which
leads to more conservative decision. Since we are allocating n = 3 ∼ 6 ancillary services, we thus
set θ ∈ [0, 2.5] (√3 = 1.732,√6 ≈ 2.449) under various situations for the ancillary service capacity
allocation.
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Suppose model (15)’s solution be y∗ ∈ Rmn and model (5)’s solution be x∗ ∈ RmnK . y∗ has a
unique meaning which is the necessary amount of capacities, of course with certain θ, to ensure a
satisfactory performance in terms of revenue. x∗ is the solution to maximize the expected revenue.
Neither of these two solutions should be placed as bids for ancillary service. Given the fact that the
estimation on ζ could be incomplete, then placing ancillary service bids by x∗ could be questionable.
Likewise, the solution from RO model is rather conservative. Although under the worst case, the
performance in terms of revenue will outperform other approaches, its performance by average
could be poor. Since ancillary service bids are daily events for market participants, the decision
makers are more concerned about the performance in terms of revenue by average.
In order to obtain a balanced bidding plan for market participants, we present our heuristic
named “resource reservation” which is based on the idea of reserving a certain amount of capacities.
In the ancillary service capacity allocation problem, the resource reservation heuristic requires the
market participant to place two bids: the regular bids and the must-win bids. The purpose of
regular bids is to pursue maximized expected revenue and the must-win bids are to ensure the
performance in terms of revenue under the worst scenario.
We determine the capacities for the regular bids by the following: let
zij := min
{ K∑
k=1
x∗ijk, y
∗
ij
}
∈ Rm (18)
and
n∑
i=1
zij , j = 1, . . . ,m (19)
would be the capacity being allocated to the regular bids. Usually, the market participant’s bid
prices are pre-determined pijk.
cj −
n∑
i=1
zij (20)
would be the capacity being allocated to the must-win bids. The market participant will place the
must-win bids with significantly low bid prices to ensure winning the auction. Fortunately, due to
the paid by clearing process, the capacity for the must-win bids will be paid at the finalized MCPs.
The allocations for n ancillary services for both regular and must-win bids are calculated by solving
φ(
∑n
i=1 zij) and φ(cj −
∑n
i=1 zij) respectively.
The resource reservation method for the ancillary service capacity allocation heuristic can be
described as follows,
Step 1. Initializing the resource reservation heuristic several days prior to the market opening and
continuously update the estimation of demands, i.e., ζ, to pursue more accurate estimation
by adaptively incorporating available information.
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Step 2. Solve φ(c) for x∗ and solve (16) for y∗.
Step 3. Calculate zij = min
{∑K
k=1 x
∗
ijk, y
∗
ij
}
.
Step 4. Solve model (5) with available capacities at m distinct locations,
∑n
i=1 zij , i.e., calculating
φ(
∑n
i=1 zij) for the regular bids.
Step 5. Applying nesting for the regular bids obtained in step 4. Nesting is an operation which
market participant allows higher MCP ancillary service to use the capacity previously
allocated to other less promising ancillary service. Consider a capacity allocation xij , i =
1, . . . , n with expected MCPs p∗1j ≤ . . . ≤ p∗ij ≤ . . . ≤ p∗nj . Then, a bid with nesting is to
allow `th ancillary service to use a capacity of
∑`
i=1 xij .
Step 6. Solve model (5) with available capacities at m distinct locations,
∑n
i=1 zij , i.e., calculating
φ(cj −
∑n
i=1 zij) for the must-win bids.
Step 7. Applying nesting for the must-win bids obtained in step 6.
Step 8. Place bids at the ancillary services market.
The resource reservation is rather an idea that reserving well determined amount of resources will
be an effective way to deal with uncontrollable uncertainty, perturbation, and poor estimations.
Given the difficulty to pursue a theoretical analysis of this heuristic, we work closely with our
power industry partner to test this heuristic with real data. The numerical result suggests that
this heuristic will considerably improve the market participant revenue’s by average performance
and bidding performance under worst case scenario. We present results in section 4.
3 ISO’s total AS amount problem
In the previous section, we assume that the individual market participants have a fixed amount
capacity, c, for allocation, with the goal of better profitability. The Independent System Operator
(ISO), however, is non-profit organization directly regulated by state agencies. The goal of ISO
is to ensure the overall reliability of the power transmission. The ISO has responsibility to advise
market participants to provide service capacity to meet ancillary services demands. Let the set
I, |I| = n be the set of market participants providing ancillary services services and the set D be
the set of ancillary services demands with |D| = m. The market participants have limited service
capacityMi for i ∈ I to jth ancillary service demand. There is a fixed cost cij for providing ancillary
services from market participant i ∈ I to ancillary service demand j ∈ D. The fixed cost cij is
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usually the opportunity cost of market participant and it equals to the ancillary service bid price
at the current ancillary services market. The ancillary services demands are highly random and
are represented by a random vector ξ ∈ Rm+ . The decision variables are the capacity from market
participant i for the ancillary service demand j, i.e. xij . Therefore, in order to pursue a system
wise minimum cost and a reliability of 1 − α, α ∈ [0, 0.5], we impose the chance constraint in the
following model,
min
x
c′x
subject to: P{
∑
i∈I
xij ≥ ξi, j = 1, . . . ,m} ≥ 1− α, xij ≥ 0 (21)
∑
j∈D
xij ≤Mi, i ∈ I (22)
The objective is to minimize the overall ancillary services costs and satisfy the reliability constraints
and capacity constraints. Model (21) is usually called the probabilistic programming, and chance
constrained optimization. For the sake of consistency, we will use the term chance constrained
optimization in the remaining part of the paper.
Model (21) is rather a difficult problem in general for many reasons. First, it is numerically
difficult to check whether or not a given point is in the feasible region rather than Monte Carlo
simulation which could be expensive when α = 0.01 or less. Second, the feasible region is, generally
speaking, not convex and resulting convergence could only be a local optimal. We need to remark
that the second difficulty may not occur under further assumptions. When the distribution is
logarithmically concave distributions and F is a set of affine functions, the feasible set of model (21)
is convex (see [10]). The recent research removes the probability measure by explicit, differentiable
if possible, constraints. For example, when the F function can be re-written into Ax ≥ ξ where
A ∈ Rd×n is deterministic matrix. Thus the probabilistic constraints
P{Ax ≥ ξ} ≥ 1− α becomes Fξ(Ax) ≥ 1− α (23)
The cumulative probability function Fξ of logarithmically concave distributions will never be con-
cave/convex. However, the log composition function efficiently transforms a non-concave function
into a convex function be the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the distribution Fξ is logarithmically concave, then log(Fξ) is concave.
The proof is provided in [9]. Thus, model (21) with necessary assumptions, i.e. logarithmically
concave distribution, affine constraints, and right hand side only random vectors, is equivalent to
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the following model
min
x∈X
f(x)
subject to log(1− α)− log(Fξ(Ax)) ≤ 0 (24)
where A ∈ Rd×n and if we define a g(x) : Rn → R
g(x) := log(1− α)− log(Fξ(Ax)) (25)
and g is a convex function in respect to x ∈ Rmn.
Model (5) is a convex optimization problem with computable objective and constraints and as
such it can be efficiently solved (see [7]). Many optimization methods combined with Monte-Carlo
techniques have been developed to take this advantage. In this paper, we apply a newly developed
method (see [3]) to evaluate the gradient of g(x) by the polynomial approximation approach and
apply the feasible direction (namely gradient mapping) on the model (25). Although we need to
adopt Monte Carlo to assess the value of cumulative function, the author proved that the obtained
optimal solution will converge to the true optimal solution with probability by an argument of
epigraph convergence. Numerically speaking, the proposed method can effectively solve mildly
large scale optimization with chance constraints.
The model (21) provides an alternative to the current market clearing process. By the current
experience, market participant’s service capacity for ancillary services is determined by market par-
ticipants themselves and ISO will host and regulate the trading. Although ISO’s goal is to maintain
the power transmission reliability, the current market clearing process does not effectively ensure
that the procured capacity will meet the uncertain demands. The proposed solution, however, will
solve this problem for ISO by suggesting service capacities to market participants. The proposed
service capacity for market participants, if implemented, will inevitably generate meaningful im-
pacts on the ancillary services market by proactively ensuring the overall system reliability. We
present the supportive numerical results in Subsection 4.2.
4 Numerical experiment
4.1 Numerical experiments for the MP’s capacity allocation plan
In this section, we will compare the proposed method with an existing method (also called “Current
Method” in this paper). The data we obtained is from the ERCOT ancillary service MCP in public
domain for March and April 2010. The experiment subjects are:
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• Current method: Market Participant submits bids with full capacity in ancillary ser-
vices market from regulation, spinning, non-spinning. If the market participant’s bid wins,
all/partial capacity will be subtracted from the available capacity.
• Stochastic programming based method: Market Participant will solve the model (5)
and revisit the previous allocation until the market opening. The bid prices are usually the
opportunity cost of generators.
• Resource reservation without nesting: Market Participant will apply the resource reser-
vation heuristic in section 2.3 to place the regular and the must-win bids. The suggested
capacities for these bids are calculated by (5) and the market participant does not apply
nesting to the bids.
• Resource reservation with nesting: Market Participant will apply the resource reser-
vation heuristic in section 2.3 to place the regular and the must-win bids. The suggested
capacities for these bids are calculated by (5) and the market participant apply nesting to
the bids to pursue higher revenue and to control risk.
We use all the previous data to determine the range of MCPs and we will obtain the optimal
solution without any heuristics involved because model (15) is a differentiable, convex optimization
on a closed and convex set. Thus model (15) can be solved within several milliseconds on an average
desktop (about 100G floating point operations per second). In the simulation part, we model the
MCP by continuous uniform distribution on [p∗−∆pi, p∗i+∆pi] and we use the same pseudo random
number generated by Matlab R2009a to obtain a fair comparison. The numerical experiments are
conducted on a Dual-Core Xeon Debian/GNU/Linux workstation with 12G memory. The software
is the Matlab R2009a with CVX developed by Stanford University.
4.1.1 ERCOT AS market, March data
A market participant in the ERCOT tries to allocate a pre-determined capacity for three major
ancillary services, regulation (URS), spinning (RRS) and non-spinning (NSRS) at one location,
i.e., m = 1. Thus, we remove the index j in this experiment. Another major ancillary service,
replacement, is procured differently at ERCOT and we thereby exclude it from our numerical
experiments.
Result in Table 2 shows that adjusting θ will change the feasible region accordingly. Once
the feasible region is enlarged, the decision will be more conservative. When θ = 0.5, resource
reservation method does the same as model (18) which allocates all the capacity to the most
promising service. Since, resource reservation method is designed to control the resource allocation
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service Name p∗i ∆pi θ = 0.5, Capacity % θ = 1, Capacity % θ = 1.5, Capacity %
Regulation (URS) $11.03 $4.38 100% 64.5% 45.0%
Spinning (RRS) $7.51 $2.37 0% 35.5% 55.0%
Non-spinning (NSRS) $5.36 $4.63 0% 0% 0%
Table 2: Ancillary Service Capacity Allocation by Model (15) Based on ERCOT March Data
under the “worst” scenario, when θ = 1, resource reservation method starts to allocate resource to
multiple services to spread the risk. So does the case when θ = 1.5. As θ increases, the service
with less MCP range is more likely to receive increasingly amount of capacity.
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Figure 6: Summary of different allocation plans with θ = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5 without nesting. The hori-
zontal axis is the replication index and the vertical axis is the revenue by simulation.
To compare and illustrate the performance of all the methods, we simulate the price of con-
tinuous uniform distribution at the range of [p∗ − ∆pi, p∗i + ∆pi] with 100 replications with the
same random numbers used. In Figure 6, the four charts are about the revenues in the order of
current methods, resource reservation method at θ = 0.5 without nesting, the resource reservation
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method at θ = 1 without nesting, and resource reservation method at θ = 1.5 without nesting
by 100 replications. The resource reservation method will greatly reduce the standard deviation
as expected when θ > 1. However, the revenue is lower compared to the current method without
nesting.
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Figure 7: Summary of different allocation plans with θ = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5 with nesting. The horizontal
axis is the replication index and the vertical axis is the revenue by simulation.
In Figure 7, the four charts are about the revenues in the order of current methods, resource
reservation method at θ = 0.5 with nesting, the resource reservation method at θ = 1 with nesting,
and resource reservation method at θ = 1.5 with nesting by 100 replications. The nesting results
dominate the current method in terms of revenue and its standard deviation. If it were applied in
the real business, the capacity allocation plan would lead to a higher revenue with a lower variation,
i.e. less risk.
In Table 3, we present the simulation data with 10, 000 replications to compare all the methods.
The simulation is based on the same random number. Clearly the resource reservation method
with/without nesting will reduce the standard deviation. The resource reservation method without
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Setting Mean St. Deviation Max Min
Current method $1653.1 $381.7 $2311.5 $997.6
SP based method $1653.1 $381.7 $2311.5 $997.6
RR, θ = 0.5 without nesting $1653.1 $381.7 $2311.5 $997.6
RR, θ = 1 without nesting $1467.3 $257.2 $2012.7 $925.2
RR, θ = 1.5 without nesting $1365.6 $206.5 $1850.7 $882.7
RR, θ = 0.5 with nesting $1653.1 $381.7 $2311.5 $997.6
RR, θ = 1 with nesting $1657.7 $375.7 $2311.5 $925.2
RR, θ = 1.5 with nesting $1660.2 $373.4 $2311.5 $882.7
Table 3: Simulation Summary for March ERCOT Data, Replication = 10, 000
nesting controls risk by almost halving the standard deviation. However, since there is no nesting
operation, the revenue is lower as well. The resource reservation method with nesting consistently
outperforms all the other methods in revenue and outperforms the current method in terms of
standard variation as well. We notice the improvement on the revenue may not be quite significant.
Our interpretation on this less significant revenue is that the regulation (URS) MCP is substantially
greater than the other two services. The overlap between URS and RRS is quite small which means
the URS will yield more revenue. Thus, the resource reservation method will tend to allocate less
capacity for other services (see Table 2). Despite the dominating URSMCP, the resource reservation
method with nesting still yields a greater revenue and smaller standard deviation. When URS MCP
is not dominating others, the improvement of applying the resource reservation method with nesting
becomes more substantial (see Subsection 4.1.2).
4.1.2 ERCOT AS market, April data
The same market participant tries to allocate a pre-determined capacity in April. The experiment
settings remain the same as the previous subsection. In Table 4, we present the capacity allocation
plan by the current method and the RR methods. Since the MCP of URS is not dominating in
April, the capacity is well spread out that 44% of capacity is allocated to NSRS service when
θ = 1.5.
In Figure 8, we illustrate the simulation result with 100 replications by presenting charts in
the order of current methods, resource reservation method at θ = 0.5 without nesting, resource
reservation method at θ = 1 without nesting, and resource reservation method at θ = 1.5 without
nesting. All the illustrations are based on the identical flow of random numbers and we claim the
differences in revenue and standard deviation are meaningful. We draw the same conclusion as the
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Service Name p∗i ∆pi θ = 0.5, Capacity % θ = 1, Capacity % θ = 1.5, Capacity %
Regulation (URS) $7.71 $7.04 30.9% 34.9% 20.2%
Spinning (RRS) $8.44 $5.62 69.1% 65.1% 35.6%
Non-spinning (NSRS) $3.52 $2.38 0% 0% 44.2%
Table 4: Ancillary Service Capacity Allocation by Model (15) Based on ERCOT April Data
previous experiment that the resource reservation method will control the risk but lead to a lower
revenue without nesting.
In Figure 9, we illustrate the simulation result with 100 replications by presenting charts in the
order of current methods, resource reservation method at θ = 0.5 with nesting, resource reservation
method at θ = 1 with nesting, and resource reservation method at θ = 1.5 with nesting. Clearly,
the resource reservation method with nesting method leads to the best performance in revenue.
Setting Mean St. Deviation Max Min
Current method $1154.2 $613.6 $2212.5 $100.6
SP based method $1154.2 $613.6 $2212.5 $100.6
RR, θ = 0.5 without nesting $1237.7 $388.9 $2129.5 $336.4
RR, θ = 1 without nesting $1232.8 $385.1 $2134.1 $324.5
RR, θ = 1.5 without nesting $921.4 $232.8 $1562.1 $292.5
RR, θ = 0.5 with nesting $1419.4 $446.4 $2212.5 $336.4
RR, θ = 1 with nesting $1403.9 $450.9 $2212.5 $324.5
RR, θ = 1.5 with nesting $1463.2 $434.3 $2212.5 $372.9
Table 5: Simulation Summary for April ERCOT Data, Replication = 10, 000
In Table 5, we simulate the bidding process with 10, 000 replications. In this experiment, there is
no dominating MCP, the resource reservation method outperforms the current method without the
help of nesting by up to 7% and reduces the standard deviation by 37%. The resource reservation
method with nesting outperforms the current method in terms of revenue by up to 26% and reduce
the standard deviation by up to 29%.
4.2 Numerical Results for ISO’s total AS amount problem
We performed computational tests on a probabilistic version of the ISO’s total ancillary services
amount problem. We have a set of market participants I, |I| = 40 and a set of ancillary services
demands D with |D| = 20. The ancillary services demands vector was generated by the multivariate
normal distribution with the mean and covariance matrix which is suggested by the ERCOT’s
24
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Figure 8: Summary of different allocation plans with θ = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5 without nesting. The hori-
zontal axis is the replication index and the vertical axis is the revenue by simulation.
historical data. Essentially, any logarithmic concave and continuous distribution, e.g. Normal,
Exponential, etc would be valid too if it fits the historical data. The cost coefficients are pre-
generated constants. We use the Monte Carlo sampling to evaluate g(x) and ∇g(x) and apply
the feasible region methods to obtain the optimal solution. During the Monte Carlo sampling, all
scenarios occur evenly likely with probability
1
N
where N = 10, 000 is the sample size. We obtain
the market participants’ service capacity, Mi, i = 1, . . . , 40 from the numerical experiments of
market participant’s ancillary services capacity allocation problem. A matlab based CVX package
is used and all experiments were done on a computer with four 2.4 Ghz processors and 12.0 Gb
of memory. The imposed chance constraint with α = 0.05 which means the procured ancillary
services capacity will ensure a reliability at 95%.
We compared the proposed method with the market clearing process in which the capacity allo-
cation xij is determined by the resource reservation method with nesting operation. We summarize
the result in Table 6. The results suggest that imposing the chance constraints will greatly improve
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Figure 9: Summary of different allocation plans with θ = 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5 with nesting. The horizontal
axis is the replication index and the vertical axis is the revenue by simulation.
the system reliability by up to 35%. Both chance constrained optimizations take more than 5
hours. Considering their remarkable social benefit in terms of lifting power system reliability, the
occurred computational cost becomes trivial. Our results will surely guarantee at least 95% system
reliability.
Data Chance constrained optimization Current market clearing gap
ERCOT March AS market 95.2% 71.4% 23.8%
ERCOT April AS market 96.1% 60.9% 35.2%
Table 6: System reliability under different methods for ISO’s total AS demand amount
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use stochastic models to solve the market participant’s capacity allocation prob-
lem and the ISO’s total ancillary service amount problem. We propose the resource reservation
method for a market participant to place both the regular bids and the must-win bids with differ-
ent purposes. The regular bids are calculated by stochastic programming model to pursue higher
revenue under the uncertain demands. The must-win bids are to ensure a satisfactory performance
under the worst scenario. Since the estimation of random factors could be incomplete, we will
constantly revisit the previously made plans until the trustworthy distributional information is
obtained. Meanwhile, we need to be prepared under the worst case scenario. Then we model the
MCP as unknown-but-bounded random variables and adopt robust optimization methods. Thus,
our resource reservation is by now a heuristic which combines the stochastic programming and ro-
bust optimization. In order to evaluate the performance, we conduct our numerical experiments on
the real business data from ERCOT. We use the identical stream of random numbers to compare
the performance of all the available methods, including the current methods, the stochastic pro-
gramming only method, and the resource reservation method with and without nesting methods.
The numerical experiment shows that the proposed method obtains a better revenue with a smaller
standard deviation. Particularly when no ancillary service has a dominating MCP range, the gain
by implementing our method is to reduce up to 29% of standard deviation and increase revenue by
more than 26%.
We propose a chance constrained optimization model to determine the ISO’s total ancillary ser-
vice amount for a market participant. The proposed model yields two major impacts to the current
ancillary services market. First, the proposed method suggests a proactive ISO action to pursue
better system reliability. Our numerical results suggest that the proposed method will outperform
the current market clearing process in terms of the system reliability up to 35%. Second, the pro-
posed method becomes an alternative to the current market clearing process when determining the
proper amount of capacity for individual market participant. Since the coefficients in the objective
is the market participant’s opportunity cost, this market participant needs to continuously reduce
the operational cost to maintain or pursue a lasting advantage in the competition. Therefore, this
central planning feature will help market participants solely concentrate on technical innovations
to reduce the unit ancillary service cost rather than polishing the ancillary service bidding strategy.
All involved parties, market participants, ISO, and public will benefit from this proposed research
by taking advantage of significantly improved system reliability.
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